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Abstract
This paper presents a scalable leader election proto-
col for large process groups with a weak membership
requirement. The underlying network is assumed to
be unreliable but characterized by probabilistic fail-
ure rates of processes and message deliveries. The
protocol trades correctness for scale, that is, it pro-
vides very good probabilistic guarantees on correct
termination in the sense of the classical specification
of the election problem, and of generating a constant
number of messages, both independent of group size.
After formally specifying the probabilistic proper-
ties, we describe the protocol in detail. Our subse-
quent mathematical analysis provides probabilistic
bounds on the complexity of the protocol. Finally,
the results of simulation show that the performance
of the protocol is satisfactory.
1 Introduction
Computer networks are plagued by crashing ma-
chines, message loss, network partitioning, etc., and
these problems are aggravated with increasing size of
the network. As such, solving protocol specifications
which require strong guarantees to distributed appli-
cations is difficult, if not impossible, over large-scale
networks. Probabilistic and randomized methodolo-
gies are increasingly being used to counter this un-
reliability by reducing strict correctness guarantees
to probabilistic ones, and gaining scalability in re-
turn. A good example of such a protocol is the Bi-
modal Multicast protocol [3], an epidemic protocol
that provides only a high probability of multicast
delivery to group members. In exchange, the proto-
col gains scalability, delivering messages at a steady
rate even for large group sizes.
Our current work is targeted toward realizing the
same goals for the important class of protocols that
classically have been formulated over reliable mul-
ticast message delivery. The specifications of these
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protocols, which include leader election, mutual ex-
clusion, and virtual synchrony, require determin-
istic correctness guarantees. However, in results
stemming from the famous Impossibility of Consen-
sus proof by Fischer-Lynch-Paterson [12], most of
these problems have been proved to be unsolvable in
failure-prone asynchronous networks.
In contrast, we envision a world where applica-
tions would run over a new class of probabilistic pro-
tocols (Figure 1) and receive probabilistically guar-
anteed services from the layer below. By virtue
of the proposed approach, these applications would
scale arbitrarily, while guaranteeing correctness with
a certain minimal probability even in the face of an
unreliable network. For example, these protocols
could be used to build a replicated file system with
probabilistic guarantees on consistency.
As a step towards this goal, this paper presents
a probabilistic leader election protocol. Leader elec-
tion arises in settings ranging from locking and syn-
chronization to load balancing [16] and maintain-
ing membership in virtually synchronous executions
[17]. The classical specification of the leader election
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problem for a process group states that at the termi-
nation of the protocol, exactly one non-faulty group
member is elected as the leader, and every other
non-faulty member in the group knows about this
choice. In this paper, we show that, given probabil-
ity guarantees on point-to-point (unicast) and multi-
cast message delivery, process failure rates, and mul-
ticast group view content, our protocol gives a very
high probability of correct termination. In return,
it gains on the scalability: with very high proba-
bility, the protocol involves only a constant number
of messages regardless of group size. We also show
how to augment our protocol to adapt to changing
failure probabilities of the network (w.r.t. processes
and messages).
Sabel and Marzullo [24] proved that leader elec-
tion over a failure-prone asynchronous network is
impossible. This and a variety of other impossibil-
ity results all stem from the FLP result [12], which
proves that there is no protocol by which an asyn-
chronous system of processes can agree on a binary
value, even with only one faulty process.
To provide a taxonomy of the complexity of the
class of consensus protocols, Chandra and Toueg [6]
proposed extending the network with failure detec-
tors. For example, the leader election problem can
be solved if and only if a perfect failure detector
is available - one that suspects no alive processes,
and eventually suspects every faulty one [24]. [10]
discusses several weakened system models and what
types of consensus are possible in these models, while
[11] presents a weakened asynchronous model which
assumes that message deliveries are always time-
bounded. Since “real” systems lack such guarantees,
these results have been valuable mostly in a theoret-
ical rather than a practical sense.
Non-randomized leader election algorithms for a
failure-prone asynchronous network model broadly
fall into the following flavors. 1) Gallager-Humblet-
Spira-type algorithms [1, 13, 21] that work by con-
structing several spanning trees in the network, with
a prospective leader at the root of each of these,
and recursively reduce the number of these spanning
trees to one. The correctness guarantees of these
algorithms are violated in the face of pathological
process and message failures. 2) Models that create
logical partitions in the network when communica-
tion becomes unreliable, each logical partition elect-
ing one leader [11]. This approach does not solve
the scalability problem but circumvents it. 3) Mod-
els that involve strong assumptions, for example that
all (process) failures occur before the election proto-
col starts [15, 28], or that all messages are delivered
reliably [5].
Probabilistic solutions to leader election in general
networks are usually classified as randomized solu-
tions to the consensus problem [8], but these focus
on improving either the correctness guarantee [23],
or the bound on the number of tolerated failures [29].
The (expected or worst case) message complexities
in these algorithms are typically at least linear in the
group size, and fault tolerance is usually guaranteed
by tolerating process failures up to some fraction of
the group size. Further, most of these protocols in-
volve several rounds of O(N) simultaneous multi-
casts to the group (where N is the group size), and
this can cause deterioration of the delivery perfor-
mance of the underlying network. Our solution as-
sumes a much weaker asynchronous network model
than these algorithms, and promises at most a con-
stant number of simultaneous multicasts with very
high probability.
A lot of work has also been done on the elec-
tion problem in specific network topologies such as
rings [25], complete networks [26], the full infor-
mation model that assumes reliable broadcasts [9],
anonymous rings [31], wireless broadcast models [7]
etc. More recently, self-stabilizing leader election has
been a focus area as this involves protocols that work
correctly even when the system starts in any arbi-
trary state [2]. An investigation of good criteria for
choosing leaders in a group appears in [27].
Our take on the leader election problem is in a
more practical setting than any of the above cited
works. We are motivated by practical considera-
tions of scaling in a real network where failures can
be characterized by probabilities. The spirit of our
approach is close to that of [3] and [30]. Our proto-
col’s probabilistic guarantees are similar to those of
leader election algorithms for the perfect information
model [18, 32], while our guarantee on the number
of messages resembles that of [14], which presents an
election protocol for anonymous rings. To the best of
our knowledge, ours is the first protocol that trades
correctness of the leader election problem for better
scalability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 describes the assumed model and statement
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of the election problem we solve. Section 3 describes
the protocol in detail. Section 4 analyses the proto-
col mathematically, while Section 5 presents simula-
tions results. In Section 6, we present our conclu-
sions.
2 The Model and Problem
2.1 Model
In our model, all processes have unique identifiers
(e.g., consisting of their host address and local pro-
cess identifier). All processes that might be involved
in the election are part of a group, which can have an
arbitrarily large number of members. Each process
has a possibly incomplete list of other members in
the group, called the process’ view. A process can
communicate to another process in its view by ucast
(unicast, point-to-point) messages, as well as to the
entire group by mcast (multicast) messages.
Processes and message deliveries are both unreli-
able. Processes can undergo only fail-stop failures,
that is, a process halts and executes no further steps.
Messages (either ucast or mcast) may not be deliv-
ered at some or all of the recipients. This is mod-
eled by assuming that processes can crash with some
probability during a protocol round and a ucast
(mcast) message may not reach its recipient(s) with
some probability. Probabilistically reliable multicast
can be provided using an epidemic protocol such
as Bimodal Multicast [3]. The Bimodal multicast
protocol guarantees a high probability of multicast
message delivery to all group members in spite of
failures by having each member periodically gossip
undelivered multicasts messages to a random subset
of group members in its view.
A few words on the weak group model are in or-
der. As we define them, views do not need to be
consistent across processes, hence a pessimistic yet
scalable failure detection service such as the gossip
heartbeat mechanism of [30] suffices. New processes
can join the group by multicasting a message to it,
and receiving a reply/state transfer from at least one
member that included it in its view.
Our analysis later in this paper assumes a uniform
distribution for process failure probabilities (pfail),
ucast/mcast message delivery failure probabilities
(pucastl/pmcastl), as well as the probability that a
random member has another random member in its
view, which we call the view probability (view prob).
2.2 Problem Statement
An election is initiated by an mcast message. This
might originate from, say, a client who wants to ac-
cess a database managed by the group, or one or
more member(s) detecting a failure of a service or
even the previous leader. In our discussion, we will
assume only one initiating message, but the exten-
sion of our protocol to several initiating messages
follows from it.
In classical leader election, after termination there
is exactly one non-faulty process that has been
elected leader, and all non-faulty processes know this
choice. In probabilistic leader election, with known
high probability,
• (Uniqueness) there is exactly one non-faulty
process that considers itself the leader;
• (Agreement) all non-faulty group members
know this leader; and
• (Scale) a round of the protocol involves a total
number of messages that can be bounded inde-
pendent of the group size.
3 Probabilistic Leader Election
This section describes the proposed leader election
protocol. The protocol consists of several rounds,
while each round consist of three phases. In Sec-
tion 3.1, we present the phases in a round. In Sec-
tion 3.2, we describe the full protocol. Section 3.3
presents the pseudo-code and discusses several im-
plementation issues.
3.1 Phases in a Round
Filter Phase
We assume that the initiating mcast I is uniquely
identified by a bit string AI . For example, AI could
be the (source address, sequence number) pair of
message I. Each group member Mi that receives this
message computes a hash of the concatenation of AI
and Mi’s address, using a hash function H that de-
terministically maps bit strings to the interval [0, 1].
Next, Mi calculates the filter value H(MiAI) × Ni
for the initiating message, where Ni is the size of
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Figure 2: One (Successful) Protocol Round
(number of members in) Mi’s current view. Mi par-
ticipates in the next phase of this round, called the
Relay Phase, if and only if this filter value is less
than a constant K; otherwise it waits until the com-
pletion of the Relay phase. We require that H and K
be the same for all members. We show in Section 4
that for a good (or fair) hash function H, large total
number of group members N , the probability that
the number of members throughout the Relay phase
lies in an interval near K, quickly goes to unity at
small values of K. This convergence is independent
of N and is dependent only on the process failure,
message delivery failure and view probabilities.
If the Ni’s are the same for all members, each
member Mi can calculate the set of members {Mj}i
in its view that will satisfy the filter condition. It
does so by checking if H(MjAI)×Ni < K for each
member Mj in its view. In practice, the Ni’s may dif-
fer, but this will not cause the calculated set {Mj}i
to differ much from the actual one. (A more prac-
tical approach is to use an approximation of the to-
tal number of group members for Ni. This can be
achieved by gossiping this number throughout the
group. Thus, Ni’s of different members will be close
and the above filter value calculation will be approx-
imately consistent.)
Figure 2 shows an illustration of one protocol
round. The initiating multicast I is multicast to the
entire group, but some group members may not re-
ceive it since mcast delivery is unreliable. The ones
who do receive it evaluate the filter condition in the
next step. The members labeled with solid circles
(2, 3, N) find this condition to be true and hence
participate in the Relay phase.
Relay Phase
As explained earlier, a member Mi that has passed
the filter and is participating in the Relay phase can
calculate the subset of members {Mj}i in its view
that would have passed the filter condition if they
received I. In the Relay phase, Mi first sends ucast
messages to all such members in the set {Mj}i spec-
ifying Mi’s preferred choice for a leader from among
its view members. This choice is determined by the
ordering generated by a choice function which eval-
uates the advantages of a particular member being
elected leader. We require all members to use the
same choice function in evaluating their preferred
leaders, breaking ties by choosing the process with a
lower identity.
Second, whenever Mi is contacted by another
member Mk in a similar manner, it includes Mk
in its view (and adds it to {Mj}i), and compares
Mk’s choice with its own. If Mk’s choice is “better”
than its own according to the choice function, Mi
relays this new choice to all the members in the set
{Mj}i by ucast messages, and replaces its current
best choice for leader. Otherwise, Mi replies back to
Mk specifying its current best leader choice.
In the example of Figure 2, the 2nd, 3rd and N th
group members enter the Relay phase, but the 2nd
member subsequently fails. If either of the 3rd and
the N th members has the other in its view, they will
be able to exchange relay messages regarding the
best leader.
Consider the undirected graph with nodes defined
by the set of members participating in the Relay
phase (relay members), and an edge between two
members if and only if at least one of them has the
other in its view throughout the phase. We call this
the relay graph. Assuming timely message deliveries
and no process failures, each connected component
of this graph will elect exactly one leader, with a
number of (ucast) messages dependent only on the
size of the component. In Sections 4 and 5, we show
that for a good hash function, the likelihood of the
relay graph having exactly one component (and thus
electing exactly one leader in the Relay Phase), ap-
proaches unity quickly at low values of K. Further,
this convergence is independent of N and is depen-
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dent only on the process failure, message delivery
failure and view probabilities. In Section 5, for an
example choice function that is widely used in many
distributed systems, we show that message delivery
and process failures do not affect this convergence.
Note that the number of ucast messages exchanged
in a Relay phase with m members is O(m3), since
each relay member’s best choice might be communi-
cated to every other relay member.
Finally, at the end of the Relay phase, when each
component has decided on one leader, each member
Mi participating in the Relay phase multicasts the
identifier of the leader selected by Mi’s component
(Mi’s current best choice) to the entire group—this
is the set of final multicasts of this election round.
The total number of multicast messages in the Relay
phase is thus O(m). Since it is likely that m lies in
an interval near the protocol parameter K which is
chosen regardless of N (analysis of Section 4), this
implies only a constant number of ucast and mcast
messages in the Relay Phase with high probability,
regardless of the value of N .
In the example of Figure 2, once the 3rd and N th
members have agreed on a leader, each of them mul-
ticasts this information to the group. Some of the
group members may not receive both multicasts, but
it is unlikely that every non-faulty member will re-
ceive neither.
Notice the possibility of using any arbitrary de-
terministic choice function for selecting good leaders
(as long as it is the same for all group members). A
good choice function can account for load, location,
network topology, etc. [27].
Failure Detection Phase
Consider a situation in which there is more than one
connected component in the relay graph. Each of
these components may select and multicast different
leaders in the Relay phase. Having each Relay phase
member broadcast its component’s selected leader
to the entire group using a probabilistic multicast
mechanism (such as Bimodal Multicast [3]) would
give us a high probability that this inconsistency is
detected by some group member (which need not
have participated in the Relay phase). If a member
detects an inconsistency such as two leaders elected
in the same round, it immediately sends out a multi-
cast to the entire group re-initiating the next election
round. If no member detects any such inconsistency,
the election protocol round would satisfy the Unique-
ness and Agreement conditions of Section 2.2 if and
only if there was exactly one component in the Relay
phase, this component selected exactly one leader,
every other non-faulty group member received at
least one of the multicast messages specifying this
selected leader, and this elected leader did not fail
during the election round.
To reduce the probability of many group members
sending out a (re-)initiating multicast message at the
same time, we could have each member Mi calculate
the hash (using H) of its own id concatenated with
the message identifier of one of the resulting mes-
sages, and send out a re-initiating multicast only
if this is lower than K/Ni. This would again give
an expected constant number of re-initiating multi-
casts. Alternatively, we could use a randomized de-
lay before sending the request: if a process receives a
re-initiation request, it need not send one of its own.
3.2 General Protocol Strategy
Our complete election protocol strategy is to use the
election round described in the previous section as a
building block in constructing a protocol with several
rounds. A complete protocol strategy specifies 1) the
value of K to be used (by each member) in the first
round of each election, 2) the value of K to be used
in round number l + 1 as a function of the value
of K used in round l, and 3) a maximum number
of rounds after which the protocol is aborted. Note
that this strategy is deterministic and known to all
members, and is not decided dynamically.
As we will see in Section 4, the initial value of K
can be calculated from the required success proba-
bility, view probabilities, process and message deliv-
ery failure probabilities for the network in which the
group members are based, and the total maximum
number of group members. Unfortunately, in prac-
tice, failure probabilities may vary over time. Since
a higher value of K leads to a higher probability
of success in a round (Section 4), we conclude that
round l+1 must use a higher value of K than round
l. One possible strategy is to use twice the value
of K in round l, for round l + 1. Other strategies
are possible, and make our general protocol strategy
adaptive to varying network failure rates and process
view probabilities. Notice also that a lower value of
the maximum number of rounds in the protocol im-
plies fewer messages but a higher value results in a
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better probability of correct termination.
3.3 Implementation
Member Mi::Election (Sequence,RoundNum):
1. On receiving “Init election” message I specifying
(Sequence,RoundNum),
select K from RoundNum using strategy
if H(MiAI)×Ni < K go to step 2
else
wait for timeout period T ime Out 1 (time for step 2
to complete) and jump to step 3
2. Find the set of members {Mj}i in my view such that
H(MjAI)×Ni < K
find best preferred leader in my view and send this using
ucast messages to members in {Mj}i
do until T ime Out 2
receive similar preferred leader messages for this
(Sequence,RoundNum) from other members Mk
include Mk in {Mj}i and Mi’s view
compare current best leader choice with Mk’s preference
(using choice function)
if Mk’s preference better
update current best leader choice and send ucast
messages to all members in {Mj}i specifying this
else
inform Mk using a ucast of Mi’s current best choice
multicast current best leader choice to entire group
wait T ime Out 3 to receive everyone’s final leader choice.
3. if received none or more than one leader as final choice
choose one of the final choice messages F
if H(MiAF )×Ni < K, multicast an initiating message I
′
specifying (Sequence,RoundNum + 1)
else
declare received choice as elected leader and include it in
Mi’s view.
Figure 3: Complete Election Protocol
Figure 3 contains the pseudo-code for the steps
executed by a group member Mi during a complete
election protocol. Each distinct election is specified
by a unique sequence number SequenceNum, and
RoundNum refers to the current round number in
this election. Mi :: Election(SequenceNum, 1) is
called by Mi at the start of every new leader elec-
tion (on receipt of the initiating message for that
election).
One practical matter we have not mentioned yet
is the use of time-outs by members to detect (or,
rather, estimate) completion of a particular part of
the protocol round in an asynchronous network.1
1Although an asynchronous network model does not ad-
Three T ime Out ∗ values appear in the pseudo-
code. T ime Out 2 is the expected time for termina-
tion of the Relay phase (before the final multicasts
at the end). This is just the worst case propagation
and processing delay needed for a message contain-
ing a relay member’s initial preferred leader to reach
all other relay members (if it is not lost by a process
or link failure). Although the number of relay mem-
bers is not known a priori, we show in Section 4 that
with known high probability, the number of relay
members who do not fail until the end of the Relay
phase is at most (3K/2). Thus T ime Out 2 can be
taken to be the product of (3K/2) (the maximum
length of any path in a relay graph with 3K/2 mem-
bers) and the maximum propagation and processing
delay for a ucast packet in the underlying network.
T ime Out 3 is just the worst case time for deliv-
ery of a mcast message. In the Bimodal multicast
protocol [3], this would be the maximum time a mes-
sage is buffered anywhere in the group. T ime Out 1
is the sum of the maximum time needed at mem-
ber Mi to calculate the set {Mj}i, and the values of
T ime Out 2 and T ime Out 3.
The above protocol presentation imposes no re-
striction on the hash function used. However, our
analysis of Section 4 assumes a fair hash function,
that is, one which distributes its outputs uniformly
in [0, 1]. For a particular hash function (e.g., the one
described in [19]), we would need to know its distri-
bution function and plug it into a similar analysis.
4 Analysis - Properties of the Pro-
tocol
In this section, we analyze the probability of suc-
cess of a round of our protocol. We also analyze the
detection on incorrect termination and message and
time complexity of a round.
Let N be the number of group members at the
start of the election round - we will assume that
this value is approximately known to all group mem-
bers so that the filter value calculation is consis-
tent across members. Let view prob be the prob-
ability of any member Mi having any other member
Mk in its view throughout the election round. Let
pfail, pucastl, pmcastl be the failure probabilities of a
mit real time, in practice timers are readily available, and we
do not assume any synchronization nor much in the way of
accuracy in measuring intervals.
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process during an election round, a ucast message
delivery, and a mcast message delivery, respectively.
The protocol round analyzed uses the parameter K
as in Figure 2. We denote the terms ((1−pmcastl)·K)
and ((1− pfail) · (1− pmcastl) ·K) as K1 and K2 re-
spectively.
For simplicity, we assume that the probabilities of
deliveries of a mcast message at different receivers
are independent, as well as that the T ime Out ∗ val-
ues in the protocol of Figure 2 are large enough. Our
analysis can be modified to omit the latter assump-
tion by estimating the T ime Out ∗ values from K
and the worst-case propagation and processing de-
lays for ucast and mcast messages (as described in
Section 3.3), and redefining pucastl(pmcastl) to be the
failure probabilities of a ucast (mcast) message de-
livery within the corresponding worst-case delays, as
well as calculating view prob, pfail for the round
length. We also assume that the hash function H
used is fair, that is, it distributes its outputs uni-
formly in the interval [0, 1].
Round Success Probabilities
Consider the following events in an election round
with parameter K:
E1: between K1/2 and 3K1/2 members are chosen
to participate in the Relay phase, and between K2/2
and 3K2/2 relay members do not fail before sending
out the final multicast;
E2: the set of relay members who do not fail before
their final multicasts form a connected component
in the relay graph throughout the Relay phase;
E3: at the end of the Relay phase, each non-faulty
relay member has selected the same leader;
E4: by the end of the election round, each group
member either fails or receives at least one of the
final multicast messages (specifying the selected
leader) from each component in the relay graph at
the end of the Relay phase;
E5: the elected leader does not fail.
Theorem 1: The event [E3,E4,E5] in an election
round in the protocol of Figure 2 implies that it is
successful, that is, the election satisfies the Unique-
ness and Agreement properties of Section 2.2.
 
Thus, the probability of success in an elec-
tion round with parameter K, denoted as
PSuccess(K,H, view prob, pmcastl, pucastl, pfail, N), is
≥ Pr[E1,E2,E3,E4,E5]
= Pr[E1] · Pr[E2|E1] · Pr[E3|E1,E2]
·Pr[E4|E1,E2,E3] · Pr[E5|E1,E2,E3,E4].
We will lower-bound each of these five terms.
Pr[E1] can be bounded by assuming that N , the
group size at the start of the round, is large enough
( K) so that, from the fairness of H, the num-
ber of members entering the Relay phase can be ap-
proximated by a normal distribution with mean (1−
pmcastl) ·K = K1 and variance K1(1−K1/N) ' K1
[20]. The (1−pmcastl) term comes from the expected
fraction of members receiving the initial multicast
message. Similarly, the number of relay members
that do not fail until their final multicast is a normal
distribution with mean (1−pfail) · (1−pmcastl) ·K =
K2 and variance K2(1−K2/N) ' K2. Thus [20],
Pr[E1] ≥ 1− 2
√
2
piK1
e−K1/8 − 2
√
2
piK2
e−K2/8
= (say) Prlb[E1].
For a random graph with m members and edge
probability view prob, [4] states that the probability
of the graph having exactly one component is Pm '
e−m(1−view prob)
m−1
, and this rises with m. Since E1
implies that there are at least K2/2 relay members
at the end of the Relay phase, we have
Pr[E2|E1] ≥ PK2/2 = (say) Prlb[E2|E1].
Given E1 and E2, E3 is satisfied if the Relay phase
member that chooses the “best” leader (according to
the choice function) among all the initial preferred
leaders in the Relay phase, does not fail before its
final multicast, and this message is delivered to all
other relay members that do not fail before their fi-
nal multicasts (since this will ensure that all relay
members select the same leader in their final multi-
casts of the round). The conditional probability of
the latter is calculated as follows: given E1, at most
3K2/2 members send out final multicasts, and given
[E1,E2], at least one spanning tree (with (3K2/2−1)
edges defined by the view relationship) can be im-
posed on the relay graph at the end of the Relay
phase. The probability that the message containing
the “best” leader is delivered along all edges of that
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spanning tree is (1− pucastl)
3K2/2−1. Hence,
Pr[E3|E1,E2] ≥ (1− pfail) · (1− pucastl)
3K2/2−1
= (say) Prlb[E3|E1,E2].
Pr[E4|E1,E2,E3] is bounded below by
Pr[E4|E1,E2,E3 and K2/2 members send out final
multicasts]
= (pfail + (1− pfail)(1− p
K2/2
mcastl))
N
= (say) Prlb[E4|E1,E2,E3].
Finally, we have Pr[E5|E1,E2,E3,E4] = 1− pfail.
Thus, the success probability in an election round
PSuccess(K,H, view prob, pmcastl, pucastl, pfail, N) is
bounded below by
PSuccess
lb
(K,H, view prob, pmcastl, pucastl, pfail, N)
= Prlb[E1,E2,E3,E4,E5]
= Pr[E1] · Prlb[E2|E1] · Prlb[E3|E1,E2]
·Prlb[E4|E1,E2,E3] · Pr[E5|E1,E2,E3,E4]
Figure 4 shows the typical variation of the first
four product terms and Prlb[E1,E2,E3,E4,E5], with
K. The plots are shown for values of K up
to 65 with (view prob, pmcastl, pucastl, pfail, N) =
(0.4, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 10000). The quick convergence
of Prlb[E1] and Prlb[E2|E1] to unity at small K (here
' 40) is independent of the value of N . In fact,
Prlb[E4|E1,E2,E3] is the only one among the five fac-
tors of Prlb[E1,E2,E3,E4,E5] that seems to depend
on N . However, its value remains close to unity for
N ·p
3K2/2
mcastl  1, or N  p
−3K2/2
mcastl , which, for K = 40,
turns out as 10107, a number beyond the size of most
practical process groups. Thus, for all practical val-
ues of initial group size N , the minimum probability
that an election round of the protocol of Figure 2
satisfies the Uniqueness and Agreement conditions
is dependent only on the failure and view probabili-
ties in the group, but is independent of N .
However, this minimal success probability in an
election round peaks at 0.6 for the above parame-
ters. This is because our estimate for Prlb[E3|E1,E2]
is very pessimistic in assuming a weak global view
knowledge, and thus including the possibility that
all the initially preferred leaders in the Relay phase
might be distinct. In a practical setting however,
a fair number of the m (non-faulty) relay members
would have the same initial leader choices (eg., if
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Figure 4: Pessimistic Analysis
the choice function preferred a candidate leader with
lower identity), so the probability Prlb[E3|E1,E2]
(and hence Prlb[E1,E2,E3,E4,E5]) would be much
higher than the curve shows. The simulation results
in Section 5 confirm this for the choice function men-
tioned above.
Detection of Incorrect Termination in a
Round
An election round may elect none or more than one
leader with probability
1− PSuccess(K,H, view prob, pmcastl, pucastl, pfail, N)
≤ 1− Prlb[E1,E2,E3,E4,E5].
If no leader is elected in a round, no final mul-
ticast will be sent out and every non-faulty mem-
ber will time out and detect incorrect termination.
If more than one leader is elected in an election
round with m non-faulty relay members (i.e., relay
members that do not crash before their final mul-
ticasts), the probability that the incorrect termina-
tion is detected is greater than Pr[at least one mem-
ber does not fail and receives all m multicasts] =
1− (1− (1− pfail)(1 − pmcastl)
m)N . Therefore,
Theorem 2: Pr[ a re-initiating mcast is sent
out to the group or all group members fail
by the end of the round | election round with
parameter K does not succeed ], denoted as
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PDetection(K,H, view prob, pmcastl, pucastl, pfail, N),
is bounded below by
PDetection
lb
(K,H, view prob, pmcastl, pucastl, pfail, N)
= Prlb[E1] · (1− (1− (1− pfail)(1 − pmcastl)
3K2/2)N ).
With K fixed so that the term Prlb[E1] is arbi-
trarily close to unity, the probability of detection of
incorrect election in a round of the presented proto-
col goes to unity as N tends to infinity.
 
Round Message Complexity
The total number of ucast messages involved in an
election round with m members entering the Relay
phase is at most m3/2 (since there are at most m2/2
edges in a relay graph with m members, and m initial
preferences for leaders). The total number of mcast
messages is 1 (initiating message) + # messages in
the final multicast phase (m) + # re-initiation mes-
sages on detection of inconsistent election. Thus,
Theorem 3: With (high) probability Prlb[E1]
((Prlb[E1])
2), the number of ucast (mcast) mes-
sages in an election round is O(K3) (O(K)) (since
K1, K2 are both O(K)). Thus, with (high) proba-
bility (Prlb[E1])
2, the number of simultaneous mul-
ticasts in the network anytime during the round is
O(K).
 
Theorem 4: Further, the expected number of ucast
(mcast) messages in a round of the protocol is O(K 3)
(O(K)). (The proof follows from a simple binomial
summation and is omitted.) This is O(1) when K
is fixed independent of N . The suggested election
protocol round thus achieves the optimal message
complexity for any global agreement protocol on a
group of size N .
 
Round Time Complexity
The time complexity of an election round with m
members entering the relay phase is = the total
message delivery and processing time of the ucast
/ mcast messages + computation time = O(m) ×
O(N ) + O(N) = O(Nm + N). The first O(N )
term comes from the delivery time of a ucast/mcast
message by the underlying network with N nodes.
The second O(N) term is due to the dominating
step where each member Mi has to calculate the set
{Mj}i of relay members in its view. Thus,
Theorem 5: With (high) probability (Prlb[E1])
2,
the time complexity of an election round is O(NK +
N). This is O(N + N) for K fixed independent of
N , which is the optimal time complexity of for any
global agreement protocol for a group of size N over
a network with N nodes.
 
5 Simulation Results
In this section, we analyze, through simulation, the
performance of an election protocol strategy from
the class described in Section 3.2. The correctness,
scalability and fault tolerance of the proposed proto-
col are more evident here than from the limited anal-
ysis of Section 4. The strategy we analyze is specified
by 1) an initial (first round) parameter Kinit = 7; 2)
for l ≤ 4, the value of K in round l is twice the value
used in round l − 1; and at l = 5, K = N ; and fi-
nally 3) the election protocol aborts after 5 rounds.
The protocol is initiated by one mcast to the group,
which initially has N members.
The unreliability of the underlying network and
process group mechanism is characterized by the fol-
lowing parameters and assumptions:
1. pucastl : ucast message loss probability.
2. pmcastl : mcast message loss probability.
3. pfail : probability of a member failing in one
protocol round. Process failures are uniformly and
randomly distributed throughout the round.
4. view prob : probability that a member has an-
other member in its view.
5. The choice function used in the simulation is the
simple one that prefers candidates with lower iden-
tities.
6. The hash function is assumed to be a fair one.
The metrics used to measure the performance of
the protocol are the following. P(Success) evalu-
ates the final success probability of the protocol, and
appears in two forms. “Strong” success probabil-
ity refers to the (average) probability that a proto-
col run satisfies the Uniqueness and Agreement con-
ditions. “Weak” success probability is in fact the
(average) majority fraction of the non-faulty group
members that agree on one leader at the end of the
protocol. This is a useful metric for situations where
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electing more than one leader may be allowed, such
as [22]. # Rounds refers to the average number
of rounds after which the protocol terminates, ei-
ther successfully, or without detecting an inconsis-
tent election, or because the maximum number of
rounds specified by the strategy has been reached.
# Messages refers to the average number of ucast
and mcast messages generated in the network during
the protocol.
Figure 5 shows the results from the simulations.
This figure is organized with each column of graphs
indicating the variation of a particular performance
metric as a function of each of the system param-
eters, and each row of graphs showing the effect of
varying a system parameter on each of the perfor-
mance metrics. Each point on these plots is the
average of results obtained from 1000 runs of the
protocol with the specified parameters. In Figures
5(a-c), pucastl = pmcastl is varied in the range [0, 0.5]
for fixed N = 2000, pfail = 0.001, view prob =
0.5. The graphs for varying pfail are very simi-
lar and not included here. In Figures 5(d-f), N is
varied in the range [1000, 5000] for fixed pfail =
0.001, view prob = 0.5, pucastl = pmcastl = 0.001.
In Figures 5(g-i), view prob is varied in the range
[0.2, 0.5] for N = 5000, pfail = 0.001, pucastl =
pmcastl = 0.001.
Figures 5(a,d,g) show the very high success prob-
ability (strong) guaranteed by the above strategy
even in the face of high message loss rates (up to
pucastl = pmcastl = 0.4, up to and beyond N = 6000
and view prob = 0.2). Notice that even the “weak”
success ratio is close to 1 for these ranges, and as
expected, is higher than the strong success probabil-
ity. Figures 5(b,e,h) show the time scalability of the
protocol for the same ranges of parameters that pro-
duced high success probabilities. Note Figure 5(e),
which shows termination within 1 expected round
for values of N up to 6000 (!) group members. Fig-
ures 5(c,f,i) show the message scalability for the same
variation of parameters. Note again the lack of vari-
ation in the expected number of messages exchanged
(Figure 5(f)) as N is varied up to 6000 members.
Figures 5(a-c) display the level of fault tolerance
the protocol possesses with respect to message fail-
ures. Figures 5(d-f) show how much our protocol
scales even as the number of group members is in-
creased into the thousands. Finally, Figures 5(g-i)
show that our protocol performs well even in the
presence of only partial membership information at
each member.
6 Conclusions
This paper described a novel leader election proto-
col that is scalable, but provides only a probabilis-
tic guarantee on correct termination. Mathematical
analysis and simulation results show that the pro-
tocol gives very good probabilities of correct termi-
nation, in the classical sense of the specification of
leader election, even as the group size is increased
into the tens of thousands. The protocol also (prob-
abilistically) guarantees a low and almost constant
message complexity independent of this group size.
Finally, all these guarantees are offered in the face of
process and link failure probabilities in the underly-
ing network, and with only a weak membership view
requirement.
The trade-off among the above guarantees is deter-
mined by one crucial protocol parameter–the value
of K in an election round. From the simulation
results, it is clear that choosing K to be a small
number suffices to provide acceptable guarantees for
the specified parameters. Increasing the value of K
would enable the protocol to tolerate higher failure
probabilities, but would increase its message com-
plexity. Varying K thus yields a trade-off between
increasing the fault tolerance and correctness proba-
bility guarantee on one hand and lowering the mes-
sage complexity on the other.
References
[1] B. Awerbuch, “Optimal distributed algorithms for
minimum weight spanning tree, counting, leader
election and related problems”, Proc. 19th Symp. on
Theory of Computing, 1987, pp. 230-240.
[2] J. Beauquier, M. Gradinariu, C. Johnen, “Memory
space requirements for self-stabilizing leader election
protocols”, Proc. 18th Annual ACM Symp. Princi-
ples of Distributed Computing, 1999, pp. 199-208.
[3] K.P. Birman, M. Hayden, O. Ozkasap, Z. Xiao,
M. Budiu, Y. Minsky, “Bimodal multicast”, ACM
Trans. on Computer Systems, vol. 17, no. 2, May
1999, pp. 41-88.
[4] B. Bollobas, A. Thomason, “Random graphs of small
order”, Annals of Discrete Mathematics, Random
Graphs ’83, vol. 8, 1983, pp. 47-97.
10
[5] J. Brunekreef, J.-P. Katoen, R. Koymans, S. Mauw,
“Design and analysis of dynamic leader election pro-
tocols in broadcast networks”, Distributed Comput-
ing, vol. 9, no. 4, Mar 1997, pp. 157-171
[6] T.D. Chandra, S. Toueg, “Unreliable failure detec-
tors for asynchronous systems”, Proc. 10th Annual
ACM Symp. Principles of Distributed Computing,
1991, pp. 325-340.
[7] I. Cidon, O. Mokryn, “Propagation and leader elec-
tion in a multihop broadcast environment”, Proc.
12th International Symp. Distributed Computing
1998 (DISC 98), pp. 104-118.
[8] B. Chor, C. Dwork, “Randomization in Byzantine
agreement”, Advances in Computing Research, vol.
5, 1989, pp. 443-498.
[9] J. Cooper, N. Linial, “Fast perfect-information
leader-election protocol with linear immunity”, Proc.
25th Annual ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing,
1993, pp. 662-671.
[10] D. Dolev, C. Dwork, L. Stockmeyer, “On the mini-
mal synchronism needed for distributed consensus”,
JACM, vol. 34, no. 1, Jan 1987, pp. 77-97.
[11] C. Fetzer, F. Cristian, “A highly available local
leader election service”, IEEE Trans. Software En-
gineering, vol. 25, no. 5, Sep-Oct 1999, pp. 603-618.
[12] M.J. Fischer, N.A. Lynch, M.S. Paterson, “Impossi-
bility of distributed consensus with one faulty pro-
cess”, Journ. ACM, vol. 32, no. 2, Apr 1985, pp.
374-382.
[13] R. Gallager, P. Humblet, P. Spira, “A distributed al-
gorithm for minimum weight spanning trees”, ACM
Trans. on Programming Languages nd Systems, vol.
4, no. 1, Jan 1983, pp. 66-77.
[14] A. Itai, “On the computational power needed to elect
a leader”, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol.
486, 1991, pp. 29-40.
[15] J.L. Kim, G.G. Belford, “A distributed election pro-
tocol for unreliable networks”, Journal of Parallel
and Distributed Computing, vol. 35, no. 1, May 1996,
pp 35-42.
[16] C.-T. King, T.B. Gendreau, L.M. Ni, “Reliable elec-
tion in broadcast networks”, Journal of Parallel and
Distributed Computing, vol. 7, 1989, pp. 521-540.
[17] C. Malloth, A. Schiper, “View synchronous commu-
nication in large scale networks”, Proc. 2nd Open
Workshop of the ESPRIT project BROADCAST
(#6360), Jul 1995.
[18] R. Ostrovsky, S. Rajagopalan, U. Vazirani, “Simple
and efficient leader election in the full information
model”, Proc. 26th Annual ACM Symp. Theory of
Computing, 1994, pp. 234-242.
[19] O. Ozkasap, R. van Renesse, K.P. Birman, Z. Xiao,
“Efficient buffering in reliable multicast protocols”,
Proc. 1st Intnl. Workshop on Networked Group
Communication, Nov. 1999, Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science 1736.
[20] A. Papoulis, Probability, Random Variables, and
Stochastic Processes, McGraw-Hill International
Edition, 3rd edition, 1991.
[21] D. Peleg, “Time optimal leader election in general
networks”, Journ. Parallel and Distributed Comput-
ing, vol. 8, no. 1, Jan, 1990, pp. 96-99.
[22] R. De Prisco, B. Lampson, N. Lynch, “Revisiting
the Paxos algorithm”, Proc. Of WDAG 97, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1320, pp. 111-125
[23] M.O. Rabin, “Randomized Byzantine generals”,
Proc. 24th Annual Symp. Foundations of Computer
Science, Nov. 1983, pp. 403-409.
[24] L.S. Sabel, K. Marzullo, “Election vs. consensus in
asynchronous systems”, Computer Science Techni-
cal Report ncstrl.cornell/TR95-1488, Cornell Uni-
versity, 1995.
[25] G. Singh, “Leader election in the presence of link
failures”, Proc. 13th Annual ACM Symp. Principles
of Distributed Computing, 1994, page. 375.
[26] G. Singh, “Leader election in complete networks”,
SIAM Journ. Computing, vol. 26, no. 3, Jun 1997,
pp. 772-785.
[27] S. Singh, J.F. Kurose, “Electing good leaders”,
Journ. of Parallel and Distributed Computing, vol.
21, no. 2, May 1994, pp. 184-201.
[28] G. Taubenfeld, “Leader election in the presence of
n-1 initial failures”, Information Processing Letters,
vol. 33, no. 1, Oct 1989, pp. 25-28.
[29] S. Toueg, “Randomized Byzantine agreements”,
Proc. 3rd Annual ACM Symp. Principles of Dis-
tributed Computing, 1984, pp. 163-178.
[30] R. van Renesse, Y. Minsky, M. Hayden, “A gossip-
style failure detection service”, Proc. of Middleware
’98, IFIP, Sept 1998, pp. 55-70.
[31] M. Yamashita, T. Kameda, ”Computing on anony-
mous networks. 1. Characterizing the solvable
cases”, IEEE Trans. Parallel and Distributed Sys-
tems, vol. 7, no. 1, Jan. 1996, pp. 69-89.
[32] D. Zuckerman, “Randomness-optimal sampling, ex-
tractors, and constructive leader election”, Proc.
28th annual ACM Symp. Theory of Computing,
1996, pp. 286-295.
11
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0.10.150.20.250.30.350.40.450.5
P(S
ucc
ess
): S
tron
g a
nd 
We
ak
p_ucastl=p_mcastl
Strong
Weak
Fig (a). P(Success) vs message loss probabil-
ity.
0
2
4
6
8
10
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
#R
ou
nd
s
p_ucastl=p_mcastl
Fig (b). Avg. #Rounds vs message loss prob-
ability.
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
0.10.150.20.250.30.350.40.450.5
#M
es
sa
ge
s: u
cas
t a
nd
 m
cas
t
p_ucastl=p_mcastl
ucast
mcast
Fig (c). Avg. #Messages vs message loss
probability.
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
P(S
ucc
ess
): S
tron
g a
nd 
We
ak
N (1000’s)
Strong
Weak
Fig (d). P(Success) vs # Group members.
0
2
4
6
8
10
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
#R
ou
nd
s
N (1000’s)
Fig (e). Avg. #Rounds vs # Group members.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
#M
es
sa
ge
s: u
cas
t a
nd
 m
cas
t
N (1000’s)
ucast
mcast
Fig (f). Avg. #Messages vs # Group members.
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
P(S
ucc
ess
): S
tron
g a
nd 
We
ak
view_prob
Strong
Weak
Fig (g). P(Success) vs view probability.
0
2
4
6
8
10
0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
#R
ou
nd
s
view_prob
Fig (h). Avg. #Rounds vs view probability.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
#M
es
sa
ge
s: u
cas
t a
nd
 m
cas
t
view_prob
ucast
mcast
Fig (i). Avg. #Messages vs view probability.
Figure 5: Simulation Results
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